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CLASSLESS NOT CLUELESS: A COMPARISON
OF CASE MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS FOR
NON-CLASS-BASED COMPLEX LITIGATION
IN CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL COURTS
Scott Paetty*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much complex litigation ... will take the judge and counsel
into sparsely charted terrain with little guidance on how to
respond to pressing needs for effective management.
Practices and principles that served in the past may not be
adequate, their adaptation may be difficult and
controversial, and novel and innovative ways may have to
be found.1
Imagine the following scenario.2 After toiling in Hollywood for
over a decade, Joe Writer finally sells his pirate movie-musical to a
big studio. Joe wants to use some of the money to remodel his
classic craftsman into the swanky pad he has always wanted by
adding a second story, a pool, and a guesthouse, reconfiguring the
backyard to resemble the tropical gardens that formed the scene of
his franchise epic. Total cost of the remodel: almost two million
dollars.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Stanford University.
I would like to thank all the judges and practitioners who generously shared their time and
experiences with me. A very special thanks to the judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court at
Central Civil West: Victoria Chaney, Carl J. West, Peter Lichtman, Anthony Mohr, and
especially Carolyn B. Kuhl. This Article would not have been possible without their candor and
guidance. Additional thanks to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review,
including Winston Stromberg, Janella Ragwen, and Alec Johnson. For Beth with all my love.
1. Introduction to MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 1, 3 (2004).
2. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of two pending cases in California's
complex court system: Karsh v. Fort Hill Construction, No. SC086901 (L. A. Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 19, 2005), and LPC Union Apartments v. R.D. Olson Construction, No. BC364391 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 5, 2007). The names of all parties and the occupation of the plaintiff have
been changed.
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Joe engages Build Your Dreams Affiliates ("BYDA") to plan
and execute the project. BYDA spins the job to Build Your Dreams,
Inc. ("BYD"), a general contractor sub-entity of BYDA that hires all
of the architects and related subcontractors to draw up the plans and
complete the work. After two years of delays, cost overruns, and
faulty construction, Joe severs his relationship with BYDA. He then
files suit for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence,
and other claims centering on BYDA's alleged bad faith. BYDA in
turn files cross-claims against Joe Writer and all of the
subcontractors (including the architects, door manufacturers, marble
importers, air conditioning and electric companies, pool and
plumbing companies, landscapers, roofers, tile installers, and the
bank that Joe used to co-finance the venture).
The third-party defendant subcontractors in turn file
counterclaims against BYDA, asserting that BYD was inadequately
capitalized and bonded for the work that it was supposed to do and
that BYD was essentially a sham corporation designed to avoid
liability. Thus, Joe's celebratory home makeover has very quickly
become a twisted legal mess more suited to one of his screenplays
than an easy fix in court.
The notion of complex litigation conjures up images of mass tort
claims with hundreds, if not thousands, of plaintiffs or cases hinging
on the resolution of complicated issues involving legions of expert
witnesses? However, the above hypothetical introduces the situation
where a "simple" disagreement between two parties can quickly
morph into a multi-headed hydra that demands more judicial
resources than a conventional civil action.4 The number of difficult
cases like the one described above has increased in both state and
federal courts in recent timesf Although state and federal judges
around the country have actively managed complex litigation for
3. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State
Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 910, 910 (2001) (discussing the perceived large scale impact of
mass tort actions on the judicial system).
4. Most CCCS cases are similar to mass tort claims because they involve numerous
plaintiffs or defendants. However, the hypothetical shows that complex litigation can also result
from an initial claim between one plaintiff and one defendant.
5. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex
Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (2007).
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decades,6 commentators continue to write voluminously on the need
for active case management and the difficulty of crafting rules and
procedures specifically for "big" cases.7 Ultimately, creating viable
procedures to deal with complex litigation is an evolving process that
demands continuous reevaluation of complex litigation principles
and their effective implementation.8
Accordingly, this Article traces the development of modem
complex litigation, from its inception at the federal level in the 1960s
through its reinterpretation by California's complex court system
("CCCS") at the dawn of the new millennium, showing how the
California system represents an innovative step forward in this
developing area of the law. Part II defines a "complex case" as well
as other key terms in non-class-based complex actions. Further, it
describes the genesis and structure of the CCCS. Part III then
addresses the question--"Who deems a case complex in the CCCS
and the federal courts?"-by looking at the similarities and
differences between procedural mechanisms in the two systems. Part
IV examines what litigants can expect after having a case designated
as complex in either court system. Part V addresses different case
management tools that California and federal judges employ in
complex litigation. Finally, Part VI shows how the CCCS has taken
the lead in creating innovative techniques for complex case
management, improving procedural mechanisms involved in
coordination, consolidation, and summary judgment. This Article
concludes that courts around the country should use the CCCS as a
model system for managing complex cases.
II. WHAT IS A COMPLEX CASE?
The differences in the development and structure of the federal
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") process and the CCCS mark their
different approaches to defining complexity. The MDL process
6. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION TASK FORCE 4 (1999) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (on file
with author).
7. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1688-89 (1992).
8. Cf TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at i (describing the mission of the California
Complex Civil Litigation Task Force).
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developed first, beginning in 1968.9 Multidistrict litigation statutes
created an institutional framework to improve the cooperation
between federal courts, allowing for the successful coordination of a
multitude of complicated antitrust cases in the early 1960s.1"
Following its inception just before 2000,11 the CCCS modeled itself
on the judicial principles embodied in the MDL and then expanded
on those principles to codify a more precise definition of a "complex
case."'
12
A. Creation of the Federal Multidistrict-Litigation Process
and California 's Complex Court System
The complex-case concept traces its roots back to a post-WWII
judicial concern with many "similar" and "protracted" cases being
filed in federal courts around the country. 3 A committee appointed
by Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed fear
that these protracted cases would "threaten the judicial process itself'
by using such a disproportionate amount of judicial resources that the
federal court system would grind to a halt. 4 After a wave of antitrust
claims against electrical manufacturers in the early 1960s, Congress
reacted to this fear by creating the federal MDL system in 1968."5
The MDL statute provides for the coordination of civil actions that
share one or more questions of common fact and allows for their
transfer into a single judicial district for pretrial proceedings. 6 This
congressional and judicial effort was a major step toward
establishing concrete, reliable procedural mechanisms for
aggregating similar cases, where only informal cooperation existed
9. See MARK HERRMANN ET AL., STATEWIDE COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS: STATE
COURT ANALOGUES TO THE FEDERAL MDL PROCESS 3-5 (2d ed. 2004).
10. See generally DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 7-18 (1986) (providing a
detailed history of the formation of the MDL Panel and the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)).
11. Paul R. Kiesel, Complex Courts: Making Courts That Work for Litigants, 20 CAL. LITIG.
245, 248 (2007).
12. Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the
State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 69-70 (2007).
13. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 30-31
(1991).
14. Id. (describing the strain on the federal courts that large cases would create without an
increased measure ofjudicial control).
15. For a discussion of the history and chronology of the MDL courts, see HERRMANN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 3-5, and Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 12, at 48-50.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(2000).
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before. 7 In federal courts, the number of complex cases entering the
MDL system has increased dramatically since its inception."l
Moreover, this trend is likely to continue as more class actions move
from state to federal courts in the wake of the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA"), bolstering the potential number of MDL cases even
further. 9
California courts followed the federal lead in pressing for
judicial reform to deal with the increasing presence of larger, more
demanding cases. In 1996, Chief Justice George of the California
Supreme Court appointed a task force to address concerns raised by
business litigants about the time and expense needed to resolve
17. See Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D.
211, 211-12 (1976); see also In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 499 (J.P.M.L.
1968) (describing how the MDL statute reduces litigation costs and saves time and effort for the
parties, the witnesses and the judiciary).
18. See JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., ANNUAL STATISTICS OF THE JUDICIAL
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2006, 3 (2006), at
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/General-InfoStatistics/CalendarYearStats-2006.pdf (showing
seven percent of the total number of cases entering the MDL system since its inception occurred
in the 2005-06 fiscal year).
19. See Georgene M. Vairo, Foreword: Developments in the Law, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 979, 983 (2006). The present Article does not address class-
based civil actions. For a detailed discussion of class actions, see Lauren D. Fredricks,
Developments, Removal, Remand, and Other Procedural Issues Under the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 995 (2006), Jennifer Gibson, Developments, New Rules for
Class Action Settlements: The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1103
(2006), and Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Developments, In Retrospect: A First Year Review of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1135 (2006). Nevertheless, an
important point regarding the difference between class-based and non-class-based complex
litigation must be made. Although class actions are subsets of complex litigation, a case need not
be a class action in order to be considered complex. See, e.g., Baker-Hoey v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 593, 603 (Ct. App. 2003) (describing a case as complex in subsequent
litigation even though the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of class
certification in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 913 (Cal. 2003)). In In re
Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006), the MDL Panel conferred
MDL status on plaintiffs' federal personal injury lawsuits against defendant drug company due to
the filing of 7,000 individual actions, 22 million pages of documents, 168 witnesses, 35,000
pages of testimony and 270 motions. Id. at 452 n.4. Nevertheless, the court denied plaintiffs'
motion for class certification because the law of multiple states applied and because they did not
satisfy the typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 459-63. Another pertinent example of the intersection of class and
non-class-based complex litigation can be found in Lockheed. In Lockheed, residents in the City
of Redlands brought suit against Lockheed Martin Corporation for allegedly dumping dangerous
chemicals into the city's drinking water. 63 P.3d at 916-17. While the trial court found that the
proposed class had sufficient numbers and adequately represented the community interest, the
California Supreme Court found that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that common
issues of law and fact predominated, and therefore the class could not be certified. Id. at 922.
Nevertheless, in subsequent litigation the court still referred to the case as "complex litigation."
Baker-Hoey, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
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complex cases.2" The task force ultimately advised against creating a
court available only to business litigants and instead recommended
forming a new specialized court, concerned chiefly with
development and oversight of a case management plan for complex
actions.21 The result of this action was the creation of the CCCS.
The CCCS now approaches the end of its first decade,22 and its
success calls for a look at the evolution of California's approach and
its conceptions of what makes a case complex.
B. Definitions of Complexity
in the Federal Courts and the CCCS
Federal courts and the CCCS have taken very different
approaches in defining a complex case.23 While codifying the idea
that cases sharing common facts should be brought together for
pretrial management, " the words "complex case" do not appear
anywhere in the MDL statute. Conversely, the California legislature
attempted to spell out a definition of "complex case." In California,
"[a] complex case is an action that requires exceptional judicial
management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or
the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and
promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and
counsel."25
The succinctness of the California statutory definition belies the
difficulty surrounding any attempt to distill the theory of complex
litigation to an easily digestible form. Commentators have termed
the fruits of the California legislature's labors as a "cacophony of
definitions"26 that wind up "myopically describ[ing]" only part of the
20. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
21. See id. at 1; see also id. at 2-3 (describing the initial studies done by the Business Court
Study Task Force and its subsequent incarnation, the Complex Civil Litigation Task Force).
22. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CAL. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, EVALUATION OF THE CENTERS FOR COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION PILOT
PROGRAM, at v (2003) [hereinafter EVALUATION].
23. For a detailed discussion and comparison of the CCCS and MDL approaches to
complexity, see infra Parts IL.B.1-2.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
25. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a). For a more detailed discussion of how courts interpret the
principle of CAL. R. CT. Section 3.400, see infra Part IlI.A. 1
26. Tidmarsh, supra note 7, at 1692-93 (citing use of term "complex" to describe cases that
are costly, involve many issues or parties in numerous forums, give rise to voluminous evidence,
or have national consequences).
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issue. 7 Nevertheless, by taking the first step of actually laying out a
definition of a complex case, California has charted a pioneering
course through the maze of complex proceedings. 8
1. California Spells Out the Definition
Since the early 1970s, California has used an aggressive and
systematic method for identifying and aggregating large cases.29
Even before the concept of a specialized court system took hold, the
California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") granted judges the
power to coordinate and consolidate related cases.3" Presently,
complex actions are expressly defined in the California Rules of
Court ("CRC").3' The rules then go further to enumerate a set of
factors that aid the court in designating a case complex. In deciding
whether an action is complex, a court must consider whether the
action is likely to involve:
(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel
legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve; (2)
Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial
amount of documentary evidence; (3) Management of a
large number of separately represented parties; (4)
Coordination with related court actions pending in other
counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or (5)
Substantial post-judgment judicial supervision.D
27. Id. at 1754 (expressing dissatisfaction with definitions that focus on procedural and
substantive elements of complexity without addressing philosophical underpinnings of complex
litigation).
28. Rheingold, supra note 3, at 911-12.
29. Id. at 912.
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404-404.9 (West 2004); see also CAL. R. CT. 3.300(a)
(defining related cases as falling into one of four categories: cases that "involve the same parties
and are based on the same or similar claims;" cases that "arise from the same or substantially
identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially
identical questions of law or fact;" cases that "involve claims against, title to, possession of, or
damages to the same property; or" cases that "are likely for other reasons to require substantial
duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges"). Related cases are defined
substantively the same in the CCCS as in the federal courts. The differences between the CCCS
and federal definitions of coordination and consolidation are addressed in Part V.B.
31. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a) (defining a complex case as "an action that requires exceptional
judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to
expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the
parties, and counsel").
32. Id. 3.400(b).
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Further, California has tried to identify the types of cases likely
to meet these criteria. The CRC provides the following categories
under which a court should consider an action "provisionally
complex":
(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims; (2) Construction
defect claims involving many parties or structures; (3)
Securities claims or investment losses involving many
parties; (4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving
many parties; (5) Claims involving mass torts; (6) Claims
involving class actions; or (7) Insurance coverage claims
arising out of any of the claims listed in (c)(1) through
(c)(6).33
If an action falls into one of these categories, then a presumption
attaches that the initial court will transfer the case to the CCCS.
Even if the case qualifies under provisional complexity, however, the
judge must still officially determine whether it is truly complex.34 In
California, only a judge can ultimately evaluate and deem a pending
case complex under the statutory definition and categories.35
2. Defining Complexity in Federal Courts
Unlike California, Congress has not attempted to define
complexity in federal statutes, and a bright-line definition does not
appear to be practical in the federal system. 36 Complexity at the
federal level is exhibited by a departure from the traditional role of
the judge as a "passive" referee to a more hands-on "managerial"
role. 7 For example, in In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products
Liability Litigation,5 the Ninth Circuit found that an MDL action is
unique because of the large number of cases involved, the greater
33. Id. 3.400(c).
34. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (stating that the court will refer back to
CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a) for final determination of complexity). For an additional discussion of
provisional complexity in the CCCS, see infra Part 1II.A.
35. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., DESKBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX CIVIL
LITIGATION § 1.02 (2006) [hereinafter DESKIBOOK].
36. Introduction to MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, at 1.
Complex designation does exist in the federal criminal context. However, I am focusing here on
the civil justice system, and, therefore, any discussion of federal criminal complexity is beyond
the scope of this Article.
37. See Barry R. Schaller, Managerial Judging: A Principled Approach to Complex Cases in
State Court, 68 CONN. B.J. 77 (1994).
38. 460 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006)
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complexity of these cases, and the statutory mandate for active
judicial management of the litigation. While cases are not officially
designated as complex in the federal court system, as they can be in
the CCCS, the particularities of large-scale MDL cases mean that an
MDL judge's decisions "may be somewhat different . . . from
ordinary litigation on an ordinary docket."39
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") begin by stating
that civil cases must be "construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '"40
Consequently, federal judges hold the theoretical power to manage
their dockets to ensure the principles of FRCP 1 through both pretrial
and trial measures. Thus, judges can invoke this pre-trial
management power to coordinate related actions.4 Further, FRCP
16 enables the court to direct the parties to appear in conference in
order to facilitate communication among the parties and streamline
the proceedings.42 As such, judges can rely on FRCP 16 to manage
the case using pretrial conferences.
Another perspective on complexity appears in the Manual for
Complex Litigation ("MCL"), the primary reference source for
federal judges regarding complex cases.43 Although the MCL is not
binding authority,44 it has become the "pre-eminent resource on many
of the issues confronting judges and lawyers handling complex
cases."45 Previously, the MCL attempted to define a complex case
by the somewhat self-evident truism: "[t]he greater the need for
39. Id.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
41. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (J.P.M.L. 2005)
(referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1407 as the proper mechanism through which to aggregate related
prescription drug claims). Further examples of the MDL statute to coordinate related actions will
be discussed infra Part V.B.2.
42. For further examples of judicial use of the principles embodied in section 16 of the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, see infra Part V.B. 1. It is worth noting here that many volumes
have been written about the ways in which federal judges wield the measures in Fed. R. Civ. P.
16, and the MDL statute, as well as Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, the federal rule governing consolidation
and severance of civil actions. Although a comprehensive look at all of these case management
practices is beyond the scope of this Article, Part V will focus on several formal and informal
tools of complex case management and provide a comparative look at procedures in the federal
courts and the CCCS.
43. Introduction to ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 1, 3
(2007).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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management, the more 'complex' is the litigation."46 While this tack
neatly avoided the semantic echo chamber that led to the CCCS's
"cacophony of definitions," it did not provide much clarity for
practitioners or judges seeking to actuate effective case management
principles.47 In fact, the MCL abandoned its prior tautological
attempts at defining complexity in its most recent edition.48
Indeed, neither the MCL nor federal case law provides any
insight as to what might make litigation complex in certain
circumstances and not complex in others. This lack of a definition is
important because, even if a federal court's treatment of a case does
not depend on formal complex designation, the expectations of
counsel regarding the degree of judicial involvement in a case may
rest on whether or not the case is seen as complex.49 The Federal
Judicial Center ("FJC") ultimately attempted to provide some
clarification by informally identifying certain complex-litigation
subject areas, such as antitrust, securities, mass torts, environmental,
and civil rights.50 In describing complex litigation in terms of these
categories, the FJC was not attempting to definitively designate these
types of cases as complex; it was merely attempting to point out that
these are the types of cases in which active managerial judging will
be most needed and most effective.5
In many ways, the subject matter breakdown presented by the
FJC provided the template for the procedures governing complex
case designation in the CCCS 2 California has gone even further in
codifying the principles of case management and aggregation,
however, by specifically defining categories for complex designation
46. Id.
47. See Tidmarsh, supra note 7, at 1692-93 (providing a detailed summary and evaluation of
the myriad characteristics that commentators have cited as the basis for their definitions of
complexity, including: number of issues, parties, fora, presence of many thorny legal issues,
voluminous evidence and witnesses, or degree of nationwide consequence).
48. Cf Scott A. Steiner, The Case Management Order: Use and Efficacy in Complex
Litigation and the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 74 (1999)
(describing the attempt at complex case definition in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(THIRD)).
49. For a discussion of differing characteristics of judicial involvement in complex cases in
the CCCS and federal court, see infra Part IV
50. Introduction to MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, at 1, 2-3.
51. Cf id. (describing generally the challenging nature of certain cases to the judge's
managerial acumen).
52. Introduction to ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra
note 43, at 1, 5.
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and expressly designating factors that qualify cases for more
intensive judicial involvement. 3 In contrast to the somewhat vague
and amorphous federal standards, California has taken an active lead
in pioneering complex case management innovations by establishing
court rules and legislation that facilitate early recognition of complex
cases.
5 4
III. WHO MAKES A COMPLEX CASE? PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR
DEEMING A CASE COMPLEX IN THE CCCS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
This section focuses on the procedural mechanisms used to
officially designate cases as complex in the CCCS and federal courts.
California procedural mechanisms are activated once a case meets
the court rule and statutory requirements for complexity." Federal
courts, on the other hand, turn to the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict
Litigation ("MDL Panel") to invoke the coordination and
consolidation procedures of the MDL statute. 6
A. Who Deems a Case Complex in the CCCS and the MDL?
California spells out the definition of complexity and then
charges judges with ensuring that complex cases are guided to the
proper court. The onus is then on the trial judge to guide the action
to resolution. The MDL process, in contrast, does not provide a
statutory definition of complexity but relies instead on the
coordination procedures within the MDL statute to indicate a
complex case.
1. California's "Designer" Complexity
The CCCS places judges at the forefront of determining both
whether a case is complex and where the case should be adjudicated.
Judges are governed by the principle that they should "compel
attorneys and litigants to prepare and resolve all litigation without
delay, from the filing of the first document invoking court
53. See CAL. R. CT. 3.400-.403.
54. Cf Rheingold, supra note 3, at 911-12 (describing how California built on the MDL
framework and distinguished itself as a pioneer in case aggregation procedures).
55. See supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing Cal. R. Ct., 3.400-403, and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404-
404.9 (West 2004)).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407(a), (d) (2000).
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jurisdiction to final disposition of the action."57 In effect, California
judges become "designers" of the litigation. The Los Angeles
County Superior Court Rules ("LACSCR") state that "the court, not
the lawyers or litigants, should control the pace of litigation."58
Furthermore, CRC 3.400(b) and (d) place responsibility on judges to
determine whether a case is complex by applying and evaluating the
factors enumerated previously in Part II.B. 1.5  This ultimate
determinative power rests with the judge, regardless of whether the
initial question of complexity comes from the presiding judge sua
sponte or from petition by the parties.6"
In the CCCS, a court will deem a case complex if it falls into
one of the provisionally complex categories.6' If an action does not
fall under one of the provisionally complex categories, a court can
still deem a case complex upon a judge's order or upon petition from
either of the parties.62 To petition, any party can affix a cover sheet
(Form CM-010) to their complaint or response, requesting a complex
designation.63 No later than the first appearance, a party may also
file a non-complex counter-designation to a complaint that has a
complex designation request.64 This counter-designation challenges
the adverse party's complexity assertion and compels the judge to
rule definitively on the challenge within thirty days.6
Since early detection and management of potentially complex
cases is the goal, a court clerk must immediately notify the presiding
judge and court executive officer of any filings that request a
complex designation.66 Furthermore, a court must make a timely
determination of whether a provisionally designated case67 is actually
complex.68 Statistical studies indicate that the CCCS effectively
employs the complex case factors in designating complex cases
57. L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 7.0(b).
58. Id.
59. CAL. R. CT. 3,400(b).
60. Id. 3.400(d).
61. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
62. DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 2.02.
63. CAL. R. CT. 3.401, 3.402(b).
64. Id. 3.402(a).
65. Id. 3.402(b).
66. DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 2.02.
67. This procedure is described supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
68. See CAL. R. CT. 3.403.
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within a wide range of legal issues.69 Furthermore, a study of 551
cases designated provisionally complex found that only four of these
cases were subsequently deemed not complex." This indicates that
the various screening procedures mandated by the court rules and
statutes are highly effective at identifying appropriate cases for the
CCCS.7 t
A court also has the discretion to designate a provisionally
complex case as not complex "if the court has significant experience
in resolving like claims involving similar facts and the management
of those claims has become routine." 2 For example, some courts
have handled so many asbestos claims over the past several decades
that they no longer need to designate these claims as complex
because the management techniques are commonplace.73 While
asbestos claims have many complex-case characteristics, such as
multiple parties and complicated discovery, the resolution of these
cases tends to follow a well-worn procedural path, and previously
novel legal issues associated with them are now well settled.74
2. MDL As the Genesis of Complexity in the Federal Courts
As noted previously, federal courts do not have an analogue to
the CCCS rules defining complex cases. Thus, any attempt to draw
procedural comparisons between the federal courts and the CCCS
should not focus too rigidly on the term "complex."75  However,
69. EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 46-47 tbl.4.2. (Of the 1361 cases admitted to the CCCS
since its inception, the number of provisionally complex and non provisionally complex cases
was roughly equal (691 to 670, or 50.8 to 49.2%), and, of the non-provisionally complex cases,
the distribution of case type across subject areas was relatively even: breach of warranty (10.8%),
business tort (5.7%), insurance coverage (4.3%), eminent domain (4.0%), other non-PI/PDAVD
(2.2%), product liability (1.8%), fraud (1.7%), other real property (1.6%), other PI/PDIWD
(1.3%), professional negligence (1.1%) writ of mandamus (1.0%), medical malpractice (1.0%),
all other civil (11.9%), and unknown (0.7%). Id.
70. Id. at 47 tbl.4.3.
71. Id.
72. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(d).
73. See DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 2.02; see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at
25 (commenting on the proposed change to Cal. R. Ct. 1800(a)).
74. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6. For an interesting discussion on the definition
of complexity, see Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, CIVIL
ACTION (Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.) Winter 2004, at 1, 3 (breaking
complexity down into three distinct categories: legal, evidentiary and logistical).
75. "There are no complex cases, only complex attorneys." Interview with R. Gary
Klausner, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 13, 2007)
(providing a humorous reference to the federal perceptions of complexity).
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federal courts have coordination, consolidation, and related case
concepts that allow federal courts to bring together similar actions
into one court for intensive case management.76  This case
aggregation is the functional equivalent of complex case designation
in the CCCS. Thus, the coordination procedures at the heart of the
MDL statute provide the federal indicia for complexity.77
While CCCS coordination procedures were originally based
upon the MDL statute,78 the MDL generally functions on a national,
interstate basis, whereas the CCCS is by definition intrastate only.79
The following section compares the coordination mechanisms in the
two systems.8"
B. How Do Courts Bring Factually Similar Complex Cases
Together? Differences Between the CCCS and Federal Courts
Surrounding Activation of the Coordination Procedures
As in the CCCS, federal court coordination procedures allow
courts to aggregate cases involving common factual questions.8' The
principle difference between MDL and CCCS coordination
procedures is the way the statutes initiate the proceedings. The MDL
statute is worded more broadly than the CCCS statute.82 Initiating
coordination via the MDL statute in federal court occurs in one of
76. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
78. See supra Part II.B.
79. Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 12, at 75-76.
80. For a closer look at the substantive differences between coordination as a case
management tool in the CCCS and federal courts, see infra Part V.B. 1
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
82. The MDL makes it easier procedurally to petition for coordination than the CCCS, and
this difference illuminates a potential area for improvement of the mechanisms in the CCCS.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(ii) (stating that initiation of coordination can be made by any party
in the proceeding), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2004) (stating that petition for
coordination must be from all parties plaintiff or all parties defendant before any other procedural
mechanism for coordination can be invoked). See generally Administrative Office of the Courts,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://courtinfo.ca.gov/courtadmin/aoc/cccfaq.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2008) ("What are the methods for initiating coordination of complex civil actions?"). Given
that the factor most often cited by practitioners as the major impetus for cost savings in California
complex litigation is the accessibility of the CCCS, see Paul Kiesel & Bryan Borys, The Cost
Savings of the Complex Civil Litigation Program, CAL. CTS. REV., Summer 2007, at 16, 18 tbl. 1,
there is an inconsistency in the way coordination is activated in light of a primary goal of the
CCCS to promote accessibility of the complex courts. Interview with Richard Aldrich, Assoc.
Justice, California Court of Appeal, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 16, 2007); see also TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 2.
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two ways: (1) sua sponte by the MDL Panel; 83 or (2) by a "motion
filed with the [MDL] panel by a party in any [appropriate] action."84
The MDL panel then determines whether to coordinate based on
three essential principles: (1) the proposed actions must involve
"common questions of fact;" (2) the transfer must be for the
"convenience of parties and witnesses;" and (3) any transfer must
"promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions."85  The
decision to transfer is a highly fact-specific inquiry that requires the
MDL panel to weigh the above principles carefully in light of their
interdependence.86 The rationale behind MDL panel decisions to
grant or deny coordination is the subject of much commentary and
will be addressed in more depth later in this Article.87 The relevant
point here, however, is that if the judge does not coordinate on her
own accord, either party to the action can initiate coordination
proceedings.88
In California courts, however, individual parties have less
discretion to independently initiate coordination proceedings. In the
CCCS, a petition for coordination may be submitted by any of the
following: (1) a presiding judge of any court in which one of the
included actions is pending; (2) all parties plaintiff or all parties
defendant to one of the included actions; or finally, (3) any party
after obtaining prior leave of the court under CRC 3.520(b).89 The
second method is referred to as "the all parties plaintiff and
defendant rule."9 The rule allows all the parties on one side of a
lawsuit to join a petition to deem a case complex directly to the
Judicial Council without prior leave of the- court.9 But if all the
parties on one side of one action do not agree to join in the petition,
an individual party must file a motion with the presiding judge of the
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i).
84. Id. § 1407(c)(ii) (emphasis added).
85. Id. § 1407(a).
86. Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 12, at 52.
87. See infra Part V.B.2; see also Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 12, at 52-61.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(ii).
89. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2004). For a gathering of the CCCS rules
regarding complex case coordination, see Administrative Office of the Courts, supra note 82
("Who can submit a petition for coordination to the chair of the Judicial Council?").
90. See Administrative Office of the Courts, supra note 82 ("Who can submit a petition for
coordination to the chair of the Judicial Council?").
91. Id.
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trial court requesting permission in order to submit a coordination
petition.92 If the presiding judge grants permission, the moving party
must submit the order along with the petition to coordinate to the
chair of the Judicial Council.93
An important and frequently misunderstood distinction of the
third prong is that it does not present an alternative to "the all parties
plaintiff or defendant rule."94 In other words, the petitioner cannot
file her motion with the presiding judge of the trial court without first
attempting to get all parties plaintiff or defendant to join in.95 These
procedures, while thorough, add an excessive procedural barrier to
coordination in the CCCS. Case aggregation under the MDL statute
is easier than under section 404 of the CCP because any party to the
action may petition for coordination without unanimous party
consent, making it easier to aggregate cases.
While the CCCS coordination statute is not currently as broad as
the federal coordination statute, there seems to be a recent movement
towards creating more flexible coordination procedures. In fact, this
change has already been implemented for non-complex cases. In
1996, the California legislature amended the coordination procedures
to add section 403, governing the coordination of non-complex
actions. 96 This amendment stated that a judge can transfer a non-
complex action, upon motion by either party, to that judge's court
when doing so promotes the ends of justice97 and the moving party
presents facts showing a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the
transfer from all parties.98 As yet, the statutes concerning complex
actions do not allow transfers upon a showing of a "good faith
effort,"99 requiring parties to seek leave of the trial court if all parties
do not agree. However, an amendment that expressly credits a
party's good faith attempt to secure agreement for coordination
might present a more welcoming invitation to enter the CCCS.
92. CAL. R. CT. 3.520(b).
93. Id. 3520(b)(2).
94. Administrative Office of the Courts, supra note 82 ("What are the methods for initiating
coordination of complex civil actions?").
95. Id.
96. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 713 (West).
97. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.1 (West 2004).
98. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 713.
99. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (adhering to the "all parties plaintiff or defendant" rule
without mention of a good faith workaround).
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IV. WHAT LITIGANTS IN COMPLEX CASES CAN EXPECT
IN THE CCCS AND FEDERAL COURTS
Forum selection has long been an important element of parties'
trial strategy."' In the arena of complex litigation, forum selection is
no less important. In fact, given the intricate nature of complex case
proceedings and the exclusive variables involved (such as numerous
legal issues, witnesses, and discovery), forum selection is of
paramount importance. The following section discusses some of the
things plaintiffs and defendants in complex cases can expect from the
procedures of the CCCS and federal courts.'
A. Timing and Efficiency
Because of their increased resources, federal courts are
traditionally thought to be better equipped to handle the larger
complex proceedings resulting from coordination or consolidation.
Yet, the success of the CCCS model in effectuating timely and
efficient resolution of complex cases is challenging this notion. For
example, the Northridge Earthquake litigation1"2 highlighted the
CCCS's successful resolution of thousands of insurance claims
brought in the wake of the 1994 disaster. Over 4000 lawsuits were
brought initially in the Los Angeles Superior Court ("LASC") when
the California legislature changed the Civil Code to allow plaintiffs
to bring bad faith claims against insurance carriers. 1°3 After noting
the immense burden on the LASC system and the complexity of the
cases, the Judicial Council transferred all 4000 cases to three judges
in the CCCS.1°4  Working together, and with the cooperation of
100. For an overview of forum selection issues, see Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal
Forum Selection and Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1097 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. ed., 2007).
101. Note that there are other areas that are ripe for comparison (for example, differences in
attorney pay structures in complex cases in state courts as opposed to the federal MDL) that are
outside the scope of this Article.
102. See, e.g., Bialo v. W. Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 3 (Ct. App. 2002); 20th Century
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (Ct. App. 2001).
103. Kiesel, supra note 11, at 248.
104. Id.
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counsel, the three judges facilitated settlement in the vast majority of
these claims within twenty-four months. °5
A key operating principle of the CCCS is to be flexible in
pursuing a timely resolution of complex matters. 1 6 This operating
principle can be seen in the court rules governing the timeframe for
resolution of cases in the CCCS. The California Rules of Court
typically call for cases filed in the LASC to be resolved within two
years of filing.0 7 However, the CRC have been amended to allow
case disposition goals to be tolled to a maximum of three years for
extraordinary (i.e., complex) cases."0 8 This amendment allows CCCS
judges the flexibility necessary to manage complex cases without
fear that case resolution guidelines will present too restrictive a
framework for these difficult cases. The California Courts of Appeal
support the primacy of CCCS case management statutes over the
imposition of case disposition guidelines. °9
In the federal context, the MDL statute also provides litigants
with ways to simplify pretrial proceedings to make them more timely
and efficient. Coordination under the MDL statute has the potential
to eliminate duplicative discovery by bringing discovery under the
supervision of one judge."0  This judge can take measures to
establish lead and/or liaison counsel"' or create document
depositories to provide means for shared interrogatories and
depositions.'2
Even though the creation of these mechanisms may speed
communication and sharing among the parties, there is no guarantee
that this will result in less discovery or a faster disposition of the
case. In fact, one notable commentator suggests that when multiple
105. Id. at 249.
106. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, Managing Judge, L.A. Superior Court, in L.A., Cal.
(Sept. 6, 2007).
107. CAL. R. CT. 3.714(b).
108. Id. 3.714(c).
109. See Polibrid Coatings, Inc. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 9 (Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that the California fast track rules must give way to case management statutes).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2000); see also HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 9.
111. ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 43, § 10.22-
.225 (discussing structure and roles of lead/liaison counsel and committees as strategies for
document sharing among the parties). For an example of effective implementation of liaison
counsel and criteria for selecting same, see In re Delphi ERISA Litigation, 230 F.R.D. 496 (E.D.
Mich. 2005).
112. HERRMANN ETAL., supra note 9, at 9-10.
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cases with multiple sets of plaintiffs' attorneys are in a single forum,
there is an incentive to undertake discovery on even more issues
surrounding the case because the efforts can be spread over more
people." 3  Moreover, given that an MDL case will often involve
many parties in multiple jurisdictions" 4 and that state proceedings
usually advance faster than federal ones," 5 the process of aggregating
these claims may push off resolution for an individual plaintiff for
years." 6 Individual plaintiffs might get swept up in expanded
discovery proceedings, causing a case to be delayed in the federal
system when it might have been "fast tracked""' 7 and placed on a trial
calendar within a year in state court." 8
Additionally, an MDL proceeding aggregates hundreds or even
thousands of cases in one court. With an understanding of the
difficulties surrounding docket management, plaintiffs' counsel can
strategically file less meritorious cases in federal court and bide their
time while pressing for settlement. By filing a complex case in the
CCCS, counsel ensures that the cases will be actively managed by a
CCCS judge. As such, plaintiffs' counsel may choose to file strong
cases in state court."i 9
B. Appellate Procedures
The procedures for appeal in complex cases highlight another
relevant distinction between federal courts and the CCCS. With
limited exceptions, federal law dictates that appeals can be initiated
113. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL?, LITIG., Fall 1997, at 43, 45.
114. Albert Sheng & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Mass Tort Management in State and Federal
Courts: A Case Study of the Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Litigation 1 (2006), http://www.
ncsonline.org/WC/Publications/MassTorts/MaTprtsPPAFinal.pdf (unpublished manuscript).
115. Id. at7.
116. Id. at2.
117. See CAL. R. CT. 3.714 (a), (b). These rules are commonly known as the California Fast
Track statutes. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106. The fast track statutes set goals
to resolve all non-complex civil cases in two years and complex cases within three years. Id.
118. See Telephone Interview with Christine Spagnoli, Partner, Greene, Broillet & Wheeler
(Aug. 29, 2007) (describing the difficulty of waiting for lengthy coordinated discovery in the
Firestone tire case); see also Interview with Paul Kiesel, Partner, Kiesel, Boucher & Larson, in
L.A., Cal. (Sept. 17, 2007) (describing a similar reluctance to file complex cases in federal court
because of the potential delay).
119. See id.
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only after final judgment. 2 ° In contrast, California statutes allow for
interlocutory appeal. 2' This major difference can have important
effects on the disposition of complex cases.
In federal courts, interlocutory appeals are considered
impediments to the efficient resolution of trial proceedings.' Thus,
interlocutory review is granted sparingly.' In MDL proceedings, a
writ is the only option for appealing MDL Panel coordination orders,
and there is no mechanism for appellate review when coordination is
denied.'24 If the petition for a writ is filed prior to the MDL Panel's
decision on transfer, then the petition must be filed in the appellate
court with jurisdiction over the MDL Panel. If the petition is filed
after transfer has been granted, however, then it can only be filed in
the court with appellate jurisdiction over the transferee court.'25
The Ninth Circuit's opinion of writs is that they are an
"extraordinary remedy" and undesirable because they interfere with
the district court's ability to control the litigation before it. 26 The
Ninth Circuit has issued guidelines for determining the
appropriateness of a writ that can be charitably described as
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) ("[T]he courts of appeals other than the United States Court of
Appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.").
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 166.1 (West 2006) states:
Upon the written request of any party or his or her counsel, or at the judge's discretion,
a judge may indicate in any interlocutory order a belief that there isi a controlling
question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion,
appellate resolution of which may materially advance the conclusion of the litigation.
122. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) ("The purpose is to
combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and
corrected if and when final judgment results.").
123. Interlocutory appeals are provided for by a provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Interlocutory
appeals are also provided for according to the Cohen collateral order rule. Cohen, 337 U.S. at
546. The Cohen collateral order rule is a three-prong test summarized most recently in Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978). In Coopers, the Court held that an appealable
pretrial order must "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment." Id. at 468. The statutory authority for interlocutory appeal by writs is found at
28 U.S.C. § 1651. This statute is commonly known as the All Writs Act and states that "all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
125. See id.
126. See Star Editorial, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1993).
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conservative.'27 These conservative guidelines have the primary
effect of streamlining pretrial proceedings.
However, a corollary (not yet addressed in empirical studies) to
this judicial philosophy might also be that federal appellate
procedures stimulate settlement. If the movant loses an important
pretrial motion, they might take the path of least resistance and settle
rather than incur the expense and further uncertainty of trial.
Settlement may be more attractive than continuing at trial with a
judge who ruled against the movant, especially because an
unsuccessful appeal would have been based on an assertion of the
trial judge's abuse of discretion.
In the CCCS, appellate procedures are far less stringent and are
therefore utilized much more regularly. The judge overseeing the
coordination motion selects the court having appellate jurisdiction if
the coordinated actions are in more than one jurisdiction.'28 While
California statutes are similar to the MDL, they do not provide for
appellate review of coordination motions;29  however, orders
denying coordination motions are usually reviewable by petition for
writ unlike in the federal courts. 3 ' The rationale for allowing writ
review of coordination orders is supported by statute, 3' as well as by
philosophical and practical concerns. In McGhan Medical
127. See Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). The court
describes the five requirements as:
1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to
attain the relief he or she desires. 2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a
way not correctable on appeal. (This guideline is closely related to the first). 3) The
district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 4) The district court's
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. 5)
The district court's order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first
impression.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.2 (West 2004). The unstated (and somewhat obvious)
corollary to this rule is that if aggregated cases arise within the same jurisdiction, the appellate
court of that jurisdiction will hear all interlocutory appeals.
129. See Lautrup, Inc. v. Trans-West Disc. Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349 (Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that the legislature would have expressly permitted appeal of coordinated petition
demands in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 904.1, if it had intended to do so).
130. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.6 (West 2004); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 304 P.2d 13, 16 (Cal. 1956) (holding that an aggregation order is not
appealable, but a petition for a writ of mandamus can be filed when justice so requires).
131. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.6 ("[A]ny party may petition ... for a writ of mandate to
require the court to make such order as the reviewing court finds appropriate.").
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Corporation v. Superior Court,132 the California Court of Appeal
noted that ultimate authority to approve decisions by the
coordination motion judge that "foster the goals of coordination" is
vested by statute in the Judicial Council.133 Chief among these goals
is that the coordination decision (either pro or con) "promote[s] the
ends of justice."'34
McGhan involved hundreds of cases involving personal injuries
resulting from breast implants.'35 The cases were spread out over
more than twenty different California counties.'36  The court
emphasized that denying coordination would have a substantial
impact on the appellate divisions throughout the state through the
result of numerous trials. 3  Accordingly, the motion judge's
coordination decision warranted careful review.'38  Given the
inherent complexity of cases in the CCCS, the need to "get it right"
in the initial determination of coordination is of paramount
importance. Therefore, it makes sense that CCCS grants writ review
of both grants and denials of coordination motions.
Furthermore, "' petitions for interlocutory appeal in the CCCS
are liberally granted even after coordination. 4 This open attitude
toward early appellate review squares with the goal to reduce costs
for the litigants. 4' If the parties agree that there are controlling and
hotly contested points of law, then quick and early adjudication by
appellate courts aids in effective resolution at trial.'42 Thus, both the
statutory language and common practice in the CCCS support
interlocutory appeal as a desirable procedural mechanism in complex
case management.
An interesting issue remains as to whether this approach is
actually more efficient, specifically, whether the prevalence of
132. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264 (Ct. App. 1992).
133. Id. at 269.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 266.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 268-69.
138. Id.
139. See infra Part V.B. I (discussing how coordination in the CCCS takes place).
140. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
141. Interview with Carl J. West, Judge, L.A. Superior Court (CCCS), in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 29,
2007).
142. Id.
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appeals in the CCCS has the unintended and undesirable
consequence of adding extra time and expense to complex
proceedings. For example, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior
Court,43 provides an example of a case that contained several issues
that bounced back and forth on appeal in the CCCS, delaying
ultimate resolution of the case. In Farmers, insurance company
defendants sought writ review on the trial court's decisions to grant a
private right of action, to deny judgment on the pleadings, and to
grant plaintiffs leave to add another claim."' While the litigation
thus remained on the CCCS docket throughout these appeals, the
time between filing of the plaintiffs initial complaint and resolution
of the final procedural issue on appeal was almost five years."'
This delay problem might not be as prevalent in federal courts
because of the final disposition standards applied there. If a party
loses a pretrial motion before the MDL judge, that party will have
difficulty obtaining an appeal before final judgment. Since the
standard for writ review is so high-abuse of discretion 46 -the
moving party is essentially arguing against the competence of the
trial judge. If the movant loses, the prospect of returning to the same
"incompetent" trial judge to resume the action will be, at best,
unattractive. Depending on the importance of the issue to the cause
of action, the losing party may be forced to think long and hard about
whether her chances of overall success have diminished too greatly.
If so, then settlement will become an increasingly attractive option.
Under these circumstances, federal appellate procedures actually do
a better job of facilitating a speedy disposition of cases 47 by
increasing the motivation for certain parties to settle.
C. Use of Special Masters
While the use of special masters in pre-trial proceedings is
commonly accepted in federal courts, they remain fairly
controversial in California. Special masters are court appointed
intermediaries who address the need for special expertise in a
143. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2006).
144. Id. at 653, 655-57.
145. The first complaint was filed in April 2001, and the final procedure issue was resolved in
March 2006. Id. at 655.
146. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 304 P.2d 13, 15 (1956).
147. See infra Part V.A.
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particular case. 14  They are known by many names, including
auditors, assessors, appraisers, commissioners, examiners, monitors,
referees, and trustees. 149  For the purposes of this Article, the term
"special master" refers to court appointed adjuncts of all types.
Special masters are a regular feature in the federal court system,5 °
and their use is provided for in the FRCP.' Yet this is not the case
in the CCCS. Even before the creation of the CCCS, the use of
special masters was a controversial part of adjudicating complex
cases in California state courts.'52 However, the use of special
masters is called for in both the CCCS Deskbook on the Management
of Complex Civil Litigation and in the CCP.153 Special masters take
on tasks in complex actions that include supervising discovery,
15 4
informally coordinating similar cases in federal and state
proceedings,'55 and administering claimant trust accounts in mass tort
cases. 56  Moreover, many commentators advance compelling
arguments for extending their use even further into the field of
complex case management. 157 So what is the controversy?
In its evaluation of the CCCS, the National Center for State
Courts ("NCSC") found an intense dissatisfaction among attorneys
with the use of court appointed special masters prior to the
148. THOMAS WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS' INCIDENCE AND
ACTIVITY 1 (2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/specmast.pdf/
$file/specmast.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1).
152. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at vii; see also Petition for Review, Inland Roof
Co. v. Superior Court, No. G023846 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998) (objecting to the trial court's
appointment of a discovery referee as antithetical to the principles of active and early judicial
involvement in a complex case).
153. See DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 2.05; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 639 (West
2004 & Supp. 2008).
154. See Lu v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 563 (Ct. App. 1997).
155. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455, 1457
(N.D. Ala. 1995).
156. See Briggs v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 211 BR. 199
(E.D. Va. 1997)
157. See Georgene Vairo, The Civil Trial: Adaptation and Alternatives: Symposium Article:
Why Me? The Role of Private Trustees in Complex Claims Resolution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1391
(2005); see also Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, Special Masters in State Court Complex
Litigation: An Available and Underused Case Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1299 (2005).
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implementation of the CCCS. 55 Practitioners felt that reliance on
special masters for pretrial management resulted in excessive costs
for litigants with few efficiency benefits.'59 Before the CCCS pilot
program, judges were often tempted to delegate too much
management to special masters. 6 ' As a result, judges gave complex
cases less attention and rarely enforced tight deadlines, resulting in
frequent delay. 6' Moreover, the report noted that attorneys and
judges found the pay structure for special masters to be
problematic.'62 Special masters are generally compensated based on
the amount of time they spend working on a case.'63 Thus, an
incentive exists for them to drag out the proceedings."
The NCSC found that after the CCCS came into being, the
overall attitude toward special masters changed as CCCS judges
became more involved with supervision and management.'65 While
the use of special masters has not disappeared,'66 CCCS judges tend
to limit them to provisionally complex cases or construction defect
actions where complicated discovery issues necessitate special
care. '67 However, certain CCCS judges refuse to use special masters
as a general rule.'68 For example, Judge Carolyn Kuhl of the Los
Angeles complex courts feels that this policy works because it
ensures that all of the management techniques are placed under
exclusive supervision of the trial judge.'69 Nevertheless, in other
CCCS jurisdictions, special masters are used more often. 7 °
158. See EVALUATION, supra note 22, at vi.
159. Id. at vii.
160. Id. at 32.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at viii.
166. See id. (describing the use of referees in twenty percent of complex cases in the CCCS.
This is a "significant drop" in the use of referees when compared to pre-CCCS days).
167. Id. at 12.
168. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106 (stating the preference of Los Angeles
judges in the CCCS to keep all facets of the litigation under their supervision. She cites
consistency, time saving, and increased control of the proceedings as the primary reasons for this
preference).
169. Id.
170. Interview with Richard A. Kramer, Judge, S.F. Superior Court (CCCS), in S.F., Cal.
(Dec. 27, 2007) (affirming his general policy of granting a special master upon reasonable request
of all the parties).
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Ultimately, the use of special masters is a feature of local court
culture.'"'
The hypo presented in Part I provides an illustration of an
instance where appointment of a special master might be appropriate.
Joe Builder and BYDA will likely have expert witnesses set for
depositions on each of the claims involved. Moreover, each of the
subcontractors, the architects, and even the bank will certainly add
their experts to the mix as well. With the addition of motions to
compel and suppress that will inevitably be filed by each of the
parties, it becomes readily apparent that judicial resources will be
stretched to their limit.
As this hypothetical action is only based on a single-family
residential improvement, imagine if the construction defect claim
involved a hundred unit condominium or a commercial development
with even more parties involved. In such cases, judges are more
likely to try to seek dependable help. Ultimately, the deciding factor
regarding special master appointment in the CCCS may well hinge
on the answer to a qualitative, as opposed to a quantitative inquiry:
whether the judge and the special master can work as a team to move
the case along more quickly.
V. CASE MANAGEMENT:
METHODOLOGY IN THE CCCS AND FEDERAL COURTS
Complex case management affords state and federal judges an
opportunity to effectuate the fundamental goal of the modem civil
justice system: "the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every [civil] action."' 72 Although the classic model of the adversarial
process generally allows litigants to drive the proceedings,'73 the
transformation to an active managerial judiciary has taken hold in
both federal and state courts.'74
In doing so, judges in both the CCCS and the federal MDL
process rely on the MCL as a guide for case management theory.'75
The MCL lays out some underlying principles for complex case
171. See EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 60.
172. FED R. CIv. P. 1.
173. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach to Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 442 (1986).
174. Schaller, supra note 37, at 77.
175. See DESKBOOK, supra note 35, at xxi.
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managers: "Judicial management needs to be active, substantive,
timely, continuing, firm but fair, and carefully prepared."'76 Because
attorneys may become immersed in the details of a complex case,
innovation and creativity in formulating a litigation plan frequently
will depend on the judge. 7 7  The downside to more judicial
involvement is an increased strain on judicial resources. However,
the more traditional adversarial approach often ignored associated
costs to the parties resulting from delays in resolution and the
extension of the litigation.
1 78
While the principles underlying an effective case management
approach may be the same in both state and federal court systems,
the ways that courts implement these principles are as different as the
judges that sit on the bench. This section focuses on the details of
some of the formal and informal mechanisms for case management
in the CCCS and the federal MDL courts.
17 9
A. Informal Tools for Managing Complex Cases
The principles set out in the MCL function as an excellent guide
which CCCS and federal MDL judges can apply to their own style
and preferred methods. Effective management calls for individual,
creative thinking on the part of each judge, using the rules as a
starting point.8 ° Moreover, effective management also depends on
176. DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 1.01; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13.
177. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13 (2004).
178. Judge Carl J. West, Los Angeles Superior Court, Management of Complex Toxic Tort
and Environmental Litigation: A Judge's Perspective, Presentation to the Environmental Law
Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association 3 (July 17, 2003) (transcript on file with
author).
179. Each of the six California complex courts has its own local rules and judicial culture.
For the purposes of this Article, however, I focus only on the case management tools of the
judges in the Los Angeles branch of the CCCS. Of the sixteen judges in the CCCS, a plurality
(seven) are located in the Los Angeles branch. Their anecdotal testimony is not intended to
represent all of the case management philosophies presenting the CCCS, but they hopefully
provide a cross section of some current attitudes toward effective handling of complex cases.
180. For an excellent examination of informal complex case management techniques, see
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689 (1992). But see
Judith Resnik, For Owen M Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 173, 174-76 (2003) (providing a counterpoint to the idea of a
creative, active judiciary); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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plaintiff and defense counsel committing to the goal of efficiency.'
8 1
This commitment entails the parties working together to move the
proceedings forward while still zealously advocating for their clients.
This forward movement involves the judge and counsel
implementing the principles behind the rules of procedure. This
effort is the essence of informal case management.
1. Active Case Management
An active judge anticipates problems before they arise rather
than waiting passively for counsel to present them. Without active
intervention, counsel in complex litigation often leave no stone
unturned in their advocacy for their clients, sometimes to the point of
miring the entire litigation in procedural quicksand."2 Management
of complex litigation requires the coordination and management of
substantial written discovery, electronically stored information, and
expert designations-as well as a judge's supervision of significant
law and motion proceedings.'83 In actively managing a case, a judge
should not take the case from the lawyers but rather provide
guidance and direction, setting limits and applying controls as
needed.'84 All of this requires a collaborative effort between the
court and counsel.
85
For example, the AOL Time Warner litigation 86 had been on the
docket for almost two years without any appreciable movement
toward resolution at the time the coordinated actions were transferred
to Judge Carl J. West's CCCS courtroom.'87 Judge West's first act
was to set a status conference in which the parties agreed to work
with the court to develop an approach to the eight pending
jurisdictional motions and more than fifteen demurrers that had been
181. Interview with Anthony Mohr, Judge, L.A. Superior Court (CCCS), in Studio City, Cal.
(Nov. 6, 2007) (emphasizing the importance of all parties "getting on board" and adopting a
cooperative mindset).
182. Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178 (describing shareholder suits that languished
in California Superior Court before being transferred to the CCCS).
183. Id.
184. Introduction to MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, at 1, 3.
185. Id.
186. Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178.
187. AOL Time Warner Coordinated Cases I & I1, JCCP Nos. 4322 & 4325, Status
Conference Agenda (Mar. 23, 2005) (on file with author) (detailing demurrer motions that were
sitting on the docket with no action taken on them).
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filed. '8 Engaging in "issue management" of this sort helps to avoid
the delay problems associated with over-litigating a complex case by
simplifying the proceedings.'89  This simplification has a
streamlining effect throughout the litigation, especially during
discovery. Fewer issues on the table translates into less discovery,
which further translates into more efficient and less expensive
proceedings.
In federal courts, a corollary to this practice of issue
management requires counsel to prepare nonbinding statements
(similar to those that might appear in a CCCS initial status
conference) that identify the issues and factual background of the
case. 90  Such statements encourage voluntary abandonment of
tenuous claims or defenses by the parties, often as a result of the
court's probing into the likelihood of success and the potential
disadvantages of pursuing them.'9'
2. Substantive Case Management
Substantive case management occurs when the judge becomes
familiar with the substantive issues of a case at an early stage in
order to make informed rulings on matters that shape the subsequent
litigation, such as scheduling, bifurcation, consolidation, and
discovery. 192  CCCS judges view their primary objective as
identifying the key legal issues in a given case and focusing pretrial
activities on resolving those issues as efficiently as possible.'93
Again, the AOL Time Warner litigation is instructive because it
shows how judges and attorneys working together to expose the
essential parts of a complex case can be crucial to good case
management. In that litigation, lead counsel created flowcharts
identifying the legal issues presented by pending demurrers and
motions to strike, associating each issue with the individual parties
188. See id.
189. Judge Carl J. West, supra note 178.
190. DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 2.21; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH), supra note 1, § 11.11 (2004).
191. For an example of this in California state court, see infra Part VI.B.1 (describing J.
Kuhl's stipulation workaround of the summary judgment problem).
192. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13 (2004).
193. EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 63.
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involved. 9 4 This permitted the court to schedule hearings on related
legal issues in an orderly and timely fashion.1
9 5
Another example of even broader substantive case management
is Judge Victoria Chaney's handling of the Vioxx litigation that came
to her court. In order to facilitate easier resolution of claims not filed
under her jurisdiction, she compiled a "trial in a box."'96 Trial in a
box is a package that contains rulings and materials on motions in
limine, liability, general causation, jury instructions, and verdict
forms.'97 The impetus behind the trial in a box approach is a desire to
ease the strain on court resources in cases where multiple plaintiffs
file claims that address the same issues and involve the same
evidentiary rules. 9' For example, most of the plaintiffs in the Vioxx
litigation suffered from myocardial infarction ("heart attack") and
stroke.'99 Thus, the trial court findings on general causation and
admissibility of medical evidence would be identical for each
successive case. With an eye toward reducing the need for
duplicative rulings on proposed depositions for the fifty expert
witnesses involved, Judge Chaney and counsel for both sides
assembled materials on these subjects to forward to other
jurisdictions. °0 The recipient trial court would then only have to
review the appropriate findings from trial in a box, instead of holding
hearings on each of the matters at issue.2"'
A potential downside to such a packaged approach is that the
objectivity of a trial court that accepted trial in a box could be
questioned. Is it possible to take prior rulings from a different
proceeding and graft them onto related litigation without somehow
194. AOL Time Warner Cases I & II Coordinated Actions, JCCP Nos. 4322 & 4325, Jointly
Agreed-Upon Charts Re Threshold Issues on Demurrers (filed on Apr. 22, 2005); Telephone
Interview with John Spiegel, Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olson (Nov. 14, 2007) (describing Judge
West's management of the demurrer in the AOL Time Warner Litigation as "innovative" and a
helpful way to push a very complex case past the pleading stage).
195. Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178.
196. Interview with Victoria Chaney, Judge, L.A. Superior Court (CCCS), in L.A., Cal. (Nov.
30, 2007).
197. Id. (noting that "trial in a box" does not contain rulings on issues surrounding specific
causation and damages, because of their individual nature, these elements are left for the trial
court).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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compromising the integrity of the hearing? Judge Chaney responds
that trial in a box does not impact objectivity because innovations
like trial in a box are voluntary.0 2 Trial judges are encouraged to
accept some, all, or none of the rulings as they see fit. Moreover,
trial judges are free to adapt the rulings to the proceeding at hand, if
necessary.2°3 Essentially, the guiding principle for CCCS judges is to
solicit cooperation among all sides in the litigation.0 4 That way,
judge and counsel can formulate a plan together.0 5 CCCS Judge
Richard Kramer invites counsel who do not approve of these case
management techniques to "come up with a better way. 20 6 Any idea
that furthers the just resolution of the case will be considered.27 This
construct reflects a desire to counterbalance any perceived loss of
objectivity with neutrality.
In an MDL proceeding, the federal judge can do a similar
version of substantive issue management by using the court's
authority to eliminate insubstantial claims or defenses through
motions to strike.2 8  For example, in the Conseco Life Insurance
litigation,20 9 Judge Howard Matz approved an order granting the
plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant's affirmative defense of
bankruptcy.21 By removing the affirmative defense, the MDL judge
eliminated complicated issues surrounding defendant's recent
bankruptcy from the trial, thus streamlining the proceedings.
2
,
1
3. Timely Case Management
Timeliness means that the judge decides disputes promptly,
particularly those that may substantially affect the course or scope of
further proceedings. The CCCS judges as a group believe that being
available to the litigants is the key to the timely resolution of the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Interview with Richard A. Kramer, supra note 170.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
209. In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. Cost of Ins. Litig., MDL No. 04-1610 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
210. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Discharge Defense, In re Conseco Life Ins.
Co. Cost of Ins. Litig., MDL No. 04-1610 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (on file with author).
211. Interview with A. Howard Matz, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., in
L.A., Cal. (Jan. 11, 2008).
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litigation.2"2 The NCSC study shows that before institution of the
CCCS pilot program, more than half of the attorneys interviewed
responded that the judges were not accessible in complex cases."'
This changed to an over ninety percent opinion that complex case
judges were accessible after the CCCS pilot program began.
14
Early and frequent status conferences provide means by which
complex case judges make themselves available and provide 'hands-
on' case management." 5 After complex cases are assigned, initial
status conferences allow the court and counsel the opportunity to
discuss issues involved and to develop an approach to case
management that suits the case.216 Taking into consideration the
convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel, the judge will
then use her discretion to schedule and conduct further conferences
as needed to facilitate the litigation.2"7  Case management
conferences provide the opportunity for the judge to address issues as
they arise, establish case management directives, and generally
supervise counsel to ensure that the proceedings are progressing
toward resolution. 18 In the Vioxx litigation, Judge Chaney took
accessibility to another level when she issued a case management
order ("CMO") allowing any case arising out of the use of Vioxx in
any district in California to be filed directly in her court.2 19 This
direct filing enabled her to ease the pathway into her court for all
Vioxx related cases, bringing about faster and more cost effective
resolution.2
CCCS and MDL judges have also focused on emerging
technologies to increase accessibility. The internet is a primary tool
for easing the burdens of service and facilitating communication
between all parties. For example, in the In Re Galvanized Steel Pipe
212. See, e.g., Interview with Anthony Mohr, supra note 181.
213. EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 29.
214. Id.
215. Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178.
216. CAL. R. CT. 3.541(a).
217. Id. 3.541(b); see also Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
218. Cf MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13 ("[D]elayed
rulings may be costly and burdensome and will often delay other litigation events. The parties
may prefer that a ruling be timely rather than perfect.").
219. In re Vioxx Coordinated Cases, JCCP No. 4247 (Cal. Sept. 9, 2005) (Case Management
Order No. 6).
220. Interview with Victoria Chaney, supra note 196.
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Litigation,22' the lead plaintiffs counsel remarked that "one of the
most valuable management tools employed by [the CCCS judge]-
and one that has continued to prove workable and valuable in other
complex litigation-was the establishment of a web site for the
cases." '22 2 Although counsel was still required to file all documents
with the court, service on all parties could be done electronically. 23
This enabled the judge and all counsel to serve orders, pleadings, and
discovery in a fast, secure, and guaranteed manner.224
In federal MDL proceedings, the internet has also become an
important facilitator of settlement claims. For example, in the Breast
Implant Litigation, the Alabama district court set up a website
providing information for all members of the settlement class. 225 The
site contains contact information for the settlement administrator and
a continuously updated posting of relevant information to the
litigants.226  The Internet is still an evolving tool for case
management. Nevertheless, it has already carved out a vital place as
a service, discovery, and settlement tool. This supports the notion
that the Internet will likely become even more widely used in
informal case management of complex cases.
Requiring parties to have a representative authorized to discuss
settlement at every conference is a further example of a management
decision aimed at creating timely options for case resolution. 8 In
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss,229 the Ninth Circuit upheld
sanctions against the defendant for failing to obey a district court
CMO requiring someone with settlement authority to be available at
all settlement conferences.23
221. Case No. BC174649 (L.A. Super. Ct., settlement June 29, 2001).
222. Kiesel, supra note 11, at 248.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See MDL926 Breast Implant Litigation, http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/mdl926.hti
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
226. Id.
227. See generally Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1529 (2005) (discussing the use of the internet in case management and the rules governing
electronic discovery).
228. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
229. 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993).
230. Id. at 1396-97.
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4. Continuing Judicial Involvement
The principle of continuing judicial involvement throughout the
proceedings requires that the judge monitor the progress of the
litigation to see that schedules are being followed and to consider
necessary modifications to the litigation plan. 31 The NCSC found
that judicial supervision of complex cases increased measurably after
the institution of the CCCS 32 CCCS judges again turn to the
Internet as an innovative tool for continual complex case
management. Through the use of electronic message boards, judges
and counsel are able to post communications regarding hearings or
conferences.233 These message boards serve as an open forum for
counsel and the judge to ask questions, give answers, issue orders,
and respond.234 Since the message boards are open to all parties, they
provide a "real time" exchange of pertinent information and avoid
any problems that might arise due to ex parte communications.
Ultimately, they allow judges to be continuously involved in the day-
to-day progress of the litigation.
5. Firm, but Fair
"Personality goes a long way." '235 Perhaps the most important
element of any case management philosophy is creating an
environment that encourages all parties to commit to a course of
action moving the case toward resolution.236 Each judge invariably
cultivates his own approach to getting the parties on the same page.
However, all agree that a positive, congenial working environment is
vital, and the foundation for effective management is laid at the
beginning of the process.237 The methods used by CCCS judges to
231. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13 (2004).
232. See EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 29 (providing statistics showing that all CCCS
judges had at least one status conference at some point during the pendency of the case and half
had conferences every three months. One third of attorneys participating in the NCSC study
reported never having a status conference on their complex cases before the CCCS program).
233. Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178.
234. Id.
235. PULP FICTION (Miramax Films 1994). Samuel L. Jackson's character lays out the
importance of a good disposition to John Travolta's character. Id.
236. Interview with Anthony Mohr, Judge, L.A. Superior Court (CCCS), in Studio City, Cal.
(Nov. 6, 2007).
237. Id.
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foster this environment are often an outgrowth of their
personalities.238
Nevertheless, a firm judicial hand should accompany all case
management decisions in order to keep cases on track. Time limits
and judicial deadlines are imposed after considering the views of
counsel. Although such limitations are not written in stone,
deadlines must be met once established or sanctions can follow.
239
Time limits and other requirements are not imposed arbitrarily or
without considering the views of counsel, and they are revised when
warranted. For example, in Smith v. Tosco Refinery, Inc.,240 plaintiffs
in a refinery explosion who did not file timely responses to a
questionnaire regarding their proximity to the accident were deemed
to have been located outside the primary exposure area.24' Judge
Kuhl issued this order after numerous delays by plaintiff's counsel in
answering the questionnaires.242
. Federal judges involved in the MDL process can be similarly
challenged when faced with furthering a management plan in
complex litigation. During the In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)
Products Liability Litigation,243 the district court dismissed certain
claims with prejudice when the parties failed to heed pretrial
orders.244  The court also ordered the severance of all claims by
plaintiffs who failed to meet certain pleading requirements. 245 When
various plaintiffs refused to file individual complaints, the district
court dismissed the actions altogether, citing a waste of resources
and prejudice to the defendants. Without the information contained
238. See, e.g., id. (placing emphasis on the importance of informal discussions between the
parties to open the channels of communication); Interview with Carl J. West, supra note 178
(stating how important it is that the parties simplify their interactions as opposed to making them
more complicated and contentious); Interview with Victoria Chaney, supra note 196 (describing
herself as "Big Momma" doling out encouragement and reprimand while remaining objective in
her efforts to enforce a civil and respectful environment conducive to just resolution).
239. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.13.
240. Smith v. Tosco Refinery, Inc., No. TC014637 (L.A. Super. Ct. order filed Nov. 28,
2007).
241. See Defendant Tosco Corporation's Motion to Fix Responses to Questionnaire Question
Number 57 as of April 2, 2007, Smith v. Tosco Refinery, Inc., No. TC014637, (L.A. Super. Ct.
May 1, 2007) (on file with author) (granted).
242. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
243. 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006).
244. See id. at 1244-47 (upholding the district court's decision to dismiss several causes of
action because plaintiffs counsel failed to adhere to a case management order).
245. Id.
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in the severed complaints, the court found the defendants' ability to
defend those cases was seriously compromised.
2 46
The FRCP grants judges authority to adopt special procedures to
deal with complex cases.2 47 For example, in recent tobacco litigation
in the Eastern District of New York, Judge Weinstein ordered the
cases consolidated for the express purpose of facilitating
settlement.2 48  The judge further ordered counsel on both sides to
select representatives to attend pre-settlement conferences and
required the parties to agree on a mediator or request that the court
appoint one.2 49  The judge referred to the complexity of the
proceedings and cited FRCP 16(c) as providing the authority to
establish special procedures to facilitate the just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of the case."' These examples highlight the
strength of informal tools to create innovative case management
plans.
B. Formal Tools
The following methods represent more structured methods
available to practitioners and judges for aggregating cases. These
methods are based in statute and court rules.
1. Coordination
Part III of this Article focused on initiation procedures for
coordination of complex cases.25' This Part compares and contrasts
how coordination functions in the CCCS and the federal courts after
the procedure has been initiated. Both the CCCS and the federal
courts involve gatekeepers to the coordination process.252 These
gatekeepers make threshold decisions regarding the appropriateness
246. Id. at 1245.
247. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (giving the court discretion in "adopting special
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems"); see also id.
advisory committee's notes (addressing the purposefully broad charter of judicial power in case
management, "the Committee felt that flexibility and experience are the keys to efficient
management of complex cases").
248. See In re Tobacco Litig., 192 F.R.D. 90, 95 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
249. Id.
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(P).
25 1. See supra Part II.B.
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2004).
CLASSLESS NOT CL UELESS
of coordination. 253  The CCCS relies on the decision of a single
judicial official, whereas the MDL process relies on the decision of
the MDL Panel to coordinate actions. 4
Before discussing the mechanics of coordination, however, a
slight refinement of the definition of related cases is warranted. As
previously discussed,255 in order to be coordinated or consolidated,
cases must be related.256 The exact definition of related cases varies
between federal and state court, even among jurisdictions in both
fora.257 However, the essential meaning is the same. Related cases
arise from similar events, or have similar issues of law, or would
require duplication of judicial resources if heard by different
courts.2 5 8
In the CCCS, when two or more civil actions that share a
common question of law or fact are pending in courts in different
counties, they can be brought to one court for adjudication.259 After a
motion to coordinate related cases is properly filed,260  the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council26' assigns a "coordination motion
judge" to determine whether a case is "complex" 262 and whether
coordination will promote the ends of justice. 263  The coordination
motion judge looks to the following factors: (1) whether a common
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
254. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.
255. See supra Part II.B.
256. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (stating the standard for relation in the federal court is
"common question of fact"), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (stating that the standard for
relation in California is "common question of law or fact").
257. Compare WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET. AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE TRIAL § 8:196.12 (2007), with id. § 8:196.13-.14 (depicting slightly different
words to describe what constitutes a related case in the California state court rules as opposed to
federal court).
258. Id. at §8:196.12 (describing Central District of California Rule 4.3.1 requiring notice to
be filed with the court when a related case is brought in federal court); see also United Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing an example of very
similar causes of action that are not "identical").
259. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404. For methods through which coordination is initiated in
California courts, see supra Part II.B. 1
260. For a detailed discussion of the proper procedure for filing a coordination motion, see
supra Part III.B.
261. See CAL R. CT. 10.1. The Judicial Council is an entity established by the California
Constitution and chaired by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. Its purpose is to
set the direction and provide leadership for the court system as a whole.
262. The complexity analysis is discussed supra Parts 1I.B, II.B. 1.
263. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.
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question of fact or law predominates; (2) whether the convenience of
parties, witnesses and counsel would benefit by coordination; (3)
whether judicial efficiency and streamlining of the court calendar
would result; (4) whether there is potential for duplicative and
inconsistent rulings; and (5) whether settlement is likely if
coordination is denied.2" If coordination is appropriate, the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council then either assigns a
"coordination trial judge" or authorizes the presiding judge of a
suitable court to assign the "coordination trial judge." '265 In practice,
the Chairperson of the Judicial Council generally defers to the
presiding judge of the court where the coordinated actions will be
sent to handle appointment of the coordination trial judge.266 The
trial judge is selected based on the following principles:
(1) The number of included actions in particular locations;
(2) Whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a
particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and
judicial resources; (4) The locations of witnesses and
evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses;
(6) The parties' principal places of business; (7) The office
locations of counsel for the parties; and (8) The ease of
travel to and availability of accommodations in particular
locations.2 67
An interesting side note to the discussion of CCCS coordination
procedures is how infrequently the formal procedures are initiated.
At the time of the most recent CCCS evaluation, over one-fifth of the
cases filed involved related actions.26' However, only 15 percent of
these cases were formally coordinated under section 404.269 Since
most of these related actions were filed in the same court, formal
264. Id. § 404.1. For examples of coordination motion rulings showing how judges have
determined when the 404 factors are served, see HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 161 (quoting
a coordination motion judge's decision for coordination in In re Bridgestone Tires, J.C.C.P No.
4160 (April 6, 2001)). See also McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 271
(Ct. App. 1992) (granting coordination after applying the 404 factors).
265. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.3 (West 2004).
266. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
267. CAL. R. CT. 3.530.
268. EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 52 (placing the exact percentage of CCCS actions
involving related cases at 21.4 percent).
269. Id.
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coordination procedures were unnecessary.27° In these instances, the
proper procedure for aggregation is consolidation.27'
Nevertheless, the question remains why formal coordination
proceedings were not initiated for the cases that did qualify for them.
The NCSC cites a judicial preference for informal coordination as
the main reason."7 CCCS judges place a premium on informal
coordination measures because they are easier than initiating the
formal procedures under section 404 of the CCP. 273 Judges can
effectively bypass the procedural requirements by coordinating with
their colleagues. Using a number of techniques, such as joint
hearings and joint rulings, these informal efforts aid in resolving
disputes during discovery and other early stages of litigation. 74
However, reliance on informal methods of coordination comes
at a price. Informal coordination makes it virtually impossible to
utilize the electronic case management measures discussed in Part
IV. This difficulty arises from the lack of common file numbers that
characterize coordinated actions. 75 Moreover, when related cases
have not gone through the formal channels of coordination, courts
and practitioners are seriously disadvantaged as they try to identify
similar cases and keep track of their progress.
At the federal level, coordination is appropriate when common
issues of fact exist in two or more civil actions. 276  These cases may
270. Id.
271. See infraV.B.2
272. EVALUATION, supra note 22, at 52.
273. Interview with Victoria Chaney, supra note 196 (describing the ease of making personal
contact with a fellow judge upon learning of a related case filing in that judge's court as opposed
to initiating the administrative hassle of an official coordinated proceeding).
274. See Schwarzer, Weiss, & Hirsch, supra note 180, at 1734-43 (describing informal
coordination measures between state and federal courts). Note, however, that these same
measures are applicable in intrastate actions as well). See also HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9,
at 42 (describing ways that attorneys can play a role in informal coordination through the use of
liaison counsels and steering committees)
275. Interview with Richard Kramer, supra note 170. For further discussion of the
consequences of informal coordination measures, see supra Part V.B. 1
276. 28 U.S.C. 1407(a) (2000). For a discussion of the difference between the language of
the CCCS and federal coordination statutes (i.e. common issue of law or fact (CCCS) as opposed
to common issue of fact (federal)), see HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 127, 17 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 112.02[3] (3d ed. 2007); Ostolaza & Hartmann,
supra note 12, at 52-53. Although the coordination statutes are worded differently in the CCCS
and federal courts, in practice the standards are interpreted in a similarly broad manner. For
example, see HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 164 (describing a broad reading of the common
issue of law or fact standard in McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 270-
271 (1992), where the California Court of Appeal upheld coordination when most of the
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then be transferred to any federal judicial district by the MDL
Panel277 provided that this transfer will be for the "convenience of
[the] parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions." '278 The MDL Panel then designates a
transferee court to handle the coordinated pretrial proceedings. 79
The MDL Panel considers many factors in making this
determination, including: (1) where the pending litigation has
progressed furthest; (2) where the largest number of cases are
pending; (3) where the documents, parties, and witness are located;
and (4) where the greatest opportunity for state and/or federal
coordination may exist.8
Recent examples of MDL Panel decisions involving
coordination motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 include the Vioxx, Pet
Food, and American Honda products liability actions. 8' Each case
involved numerous related federal claims in multiple jurisdictions,
and a look at the MDL Panel transfer orders in each case reveals an
array of different considerations that the MDL Panel feels are
important in selecting an appropriate transfer forum. The parties in
the Vioxx and Pet Food actions could not agree on an appropriate
transferee court; so the MDL Panel issued a transfer order based on
an application of the factors listed above. 82 In the Pet Food
litigation, the MDL Panel found that a number of district courts
would be appropriate transferee venues and chose a geographically
convenient district court with the most related cases pending. 83 In
the Vioxx action, however, where the related cases were so spread
out that there was no geographic focal point, the MDL Panel chose
complaints were uniform even though the cases contained different defendants, products, and
product warnings).
277. For a brief history of the MDL Panel's formation, see Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note
12, at 47.
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
279. Id. § 1407(b).
280. HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
281. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1657 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 16, 2005); In re Pet Food Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1850 (J.P.M.L. June 19, 2007); In re American Honda Motor Co. Oil Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1737 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 24, 2006). For excellent discussions of forum selection
issues surrounding MDL transferee courts, see Georgene Vairo, Legislation Update, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 16, 2002, at B7 and John F. Nangle, From the Horse's Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COuNS. J. 341 (1999).
282. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, at 2; see also In re Pet Food Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1850, at 2.
283. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1850, at 2.
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the transferee court based on the experience of the district judge in
handling complex cases and the availability of space on the docket.284
The parties in American Honda made the decision much simpler for
the MDL Panel by stipulating to a transferee court in the same
location as the defendant's principle place of business.285
2. Consolidation
Consolidation is another formal tool available for judges and
practitioners to manage complex cases. Nevertheless, disagreement
exists as to what precisely constitutes consolidation for the purposes
of complex litigation. This Part provides a brief overview of the
different definitions of consolidation, describes the various rules that
govern consolidation in the CCCS and the federal courts, and shows
the ways that coordination and consolidation blend when discussing
complex case management.
Consolidation is a malleable concept.286 The term has been used
to describe the process by which several actions are stayed while a
related action is adjudicated, and then the judgment in the trial that
proceeds is applied to the stayed actions. 87 More commonly,
however, consolidation is used to describe either the combination of
several actions into one, where the individual claims effectively
becoming a single claim for which only one judgment is entered, 88
or the aggregation of several actions into one court with each action
remaining separate and requiring a separate judgment. 29  The
inevitable consequence of these different definitions and uses of the
term "consolidation" is a wealth of legal literature on the topic."'
284. In re Vioxx Litig., No. 1657, at 2.
285. In re Am. Honda Litig., No. 1737, at 2.
286. Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants:
What They Are, What They Might Be, Part I: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and
Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 724 (1995).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 725-26 (describing these cases as "repetitive," representing "multiple suits on the
same claim by the same plaintiff against the same defendant," or "reactive" where "a separate suit
has been filed by a defendant to the first action ... [claiming] he is not liable [for] the . . . first
action or asserting an affirmative claim that arises out the same transaction or occurrence as the..
first action").
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER'S STUDY (1994) (providing an in depth
study of federal and state transfer and consolidation theory and detailed recommendations for
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Consolidation procedures in the federal courts and the CCCS are
governed by statute. In federal courts, FRCP 42 provides for
consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact
pending before the court.29' The rule further states that the court may
also, at its discretion, order separate trials of claims or even issues
within claims. 292  The purpose of the rule is to enhance trial court
efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and
procedures) and to avoid the substantial danger of inconsistent
decisions.293 FRCP 42 gives the trial judge wide latitude in deciding
to consolidate cases,294 and consolidation has become increasingly
useful with the advent of complex litigation .2  For example, in In re
Asbestos Products Liability Litigation,9 the MDL Panel revisited an
earlier denial of consolidation and held that the increasing
"magnitude" of the litigation warranted consolidation of the
actions.297  Similarly, consolidation has become a particularly
effective case management tool for aggregating claims in mass-
accident cases.298
CCP section 1048 governs consolidation in the CCCS299 and is
intended to conform in substance to FRCP 42.300 The only difference
between the California and federal statutes is in the wording of CCP
revising procedures); Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995
B.Y.U. L. REv. 879, 901-05 (offering a critique of the A.L.I. study).
291. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (stating that the court may order consolidation to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay). An in depth discussion of the standards of consolidation is beyond the scope of
this Article. For an excellent overview of the various interpretations of the standards for
coordination in federal and state courts, see Marcus, supra note 290, at 901-05.
292. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (giving the court the power to order bifurcated trials in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy).
293. See, e.g., Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17 (Ct.
App. 1996) (upholding the trial court decision to consolidate actions while citing the appropriate
use of discretion in finding that justice would be served by consolidation).
294. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2381 (3rd ed. 2008).
295. Id.
296. 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
297. Id. at418.
298. See Marcus, supra note 290, at 886; see also Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54
(D.R.I. 2004) (nightclub fire); Case v. ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 (E.D. La.
2006) (hurricane). For an examination of the Northridge earthquake litigation, see infra Part
IV.A.
299. Section (a) of the Califomia statute is identical to FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a).
300. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048 legislative committee comments (West 2007).
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section 1048(b). CCP section 1048(b) differs in the description of
the various related claims that may be considered for
consolidation.3"' The practical effect of the consolidation statues in
the CCCS is that only two types of consolidation are possible: (1)
consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions
remain otherwise separate; or (2) complete consolidation, where the
consolidated actions effectively merge into a single proceeding under
one case number and result in only one judgment.0 2 As mentioned
above, however, there is no statutory guidance regarding when either
definition is appropriate.
Adding to the confusion surrounding these multiple definitions
and various rules concerning consolidated actions is the occasional
overlap in usage when referring to "coordination" and
"consolidation." Sometimes the two terms are even used in the same
sentence and seem virtually interchangeable. For example, in the
Asbestos Litigation discussed above, the MDL Panel (citing the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407) described the centralized claims as
"coordinated or consolidated" proceedings.0 3 Moreover, some states
invoke consolidation when bringing all of the cases in various
counties to a judge in one county.3"4
CCCS procedures offer a refinement of consolidation and
coordination that provides some much needed clarity. The CCCS
focuses on the locus of the related actions when determining whether
coordination or consolidation is appropriate."0 Coordination brings
together related civil actions pending in different counties.30 6
Consolidation unites multiple related cases that have been filed in the
same county.30 7  Ultimately, the clear line drawn between
coordination and consolidation in the CCCS is another example of
301. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), enumerates the list of the various claims over which the court
retains authority to sever when justice or economy requires (cross-claim, counterclaim, third party
claim), whereas CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048(b), lists only cross-complaints.
302. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 22 Cal. 4th 1127, 1147-48 (2000).
303. In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 421 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
304. Rheingold, supra note 3, at 912.
305. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL CASE
COORDINATION FACT SHEET 2 (2007), available at http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/cmplx
lit/bin/Califomia%20Complex%2OCase%20Coordination.pdf, see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
404.
306. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 305, at 1.
307. Id. at 3; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 403, 404, 1048(a).
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the ways that the CCCS offers simple and functional procedural
mechanisms for managing complex cases.
VI. GOING FORWARD: WHICH SYSTEM IS BETTER?
The remainder of this Article addresses some of the procedural
successes and failures of complex case management in the CCCS
and the federal courts. Through an exploration of the points of
divergence in each system regarding transferee court jurisdiction,
summary judgment, and late appearing parties, this Article sets forth
the proposition that while neither system is perfect, the CCCS
provides a better model of innovative and proactive measures for
addressing complex cases.
A. California Dreaming:
What the CCCS Does Better than MDL
1. Transferee Court Jurisdiction Problem
The most glaring difference between the CCCS and the MDL
process is the power of CCCS judges to keep complex cases
coordinated through trial."8 MDL judges, conversely, only have the
power to handle coordinated actions through the pretrial phase.3"9
This ability to oversee complex cases from filing to disposition is
perhaps the CCCS's biggest strength. CCCS judges can dispense
with the actions by settlement, dismissal with prejudice, summary
judgment, judgment after trial, or remand of individual cases to their
original courts.310 Having one judge in control of the proceedings
provides continuity, consistency, and familiarity. 1 In contrast, the
specter of inconsistency and uncertainty hangs over coordinated
actions in the MDL process. In many instances, cases under the
308. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.3 (granting the coordination trial judge the power to
"hear and determine the actions").
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) (providing that coordinated actions must be remanded "at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated").
310. CAL. R. CT. 3.545(a); see also HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 126.
311. See, e.g., Interview with Victoria Chaney, supra note 196 (describing the importance of
continuity in discovery rulings); see also Interview with Paul Kiesel, supra note 118 (discussing
the convenience of having one judge who knows the issues and facts of the case). But see
Telephone Interview with Jeff S. Westerman, Partner, Milberg Weiss (Sept. 17, 2007) (noting
that if the trial judge is not seeing eye-to-eye with you regarding your case, being stuck with him
throughout a protracted complex case can be difficult).
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MDL are brought together from vastly different geographic
regions, 12 and the parties have had no previous dealings with either
the judge or the forum court. While aggregation of the claims for the
pretrial phase may ultimately serve an efficient resolution of the
action, there is no guarantee that the parties themselves will enter this
new forum with enthusiasm.313 The effect of this lack of enthusiasm
is an increased possibility of delay.
The MDL statute vests the transferee court with pretrial power
over transferred cases identical to the district court where the action
was originally filed,314 and the transferee court overseeing the MDL
proceeding can try cases that were originally filed before it.315 After
pretrial proceedings are concluded, however, the transferee judge
sends the case back to the MDL Panel for remand to the court from
which it was first transferred.316 In the past, MDL transferee judges
would invoke the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, to sidestep the
pretrial limitation and hear the trial on the merits." 7 But in Lexecon
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,"8 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that transferee courts could not try cases that originated in
other districts. 9 Lexecon severely limited the transfer ability of
MDL courts.3 2' Now, the transferee judge must remand cases that
originated elsewhere back to their original courts after pretrial
proceedings are complete.321 This presents the potential for delay and
inefficiency because different judges will have to be brought up to
312. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355-59 (J.P.M.L.
2005) (listing coordinated actions from Vermont, Louisiana, California and Puerto Rico, among
other places).
313. For a discussion of the trepidation that can accompany plaintiff's attorneys in federal
court, see infra Part V.
314. See Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts
and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 578 n.21 (1978) (citing the legislative history of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 suggesting Congressional intent to provide the transferee judge complete power to rule on
all pretrial matters and motions).
315. See generally In re Brand-Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1378-79 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (discussing the defining characteristics of transferee and
transferor courts).
316. R.P.J.P.M.L. 7.6(b).
317. Marcus, supra note 290, at 885.
318. 523 U.S. 26 (1998)
319. Id. at 40-41; see also HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 113, at 43; ANNOTATED MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 43, § 20.14 author's comments.
320. For a detailed discussion of the Lexecon holding and its consequences for venue in MDL
proceedings, see Vairo, supra note 100, at 495-99.
321. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 34-35.
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speed on the same facts, law, and parties. After Lexecon, Congress
has taken steps toward passing legislation that would allow
transferee courts to retain jurisdiction over MDL cases through trial,
but none of these measures has become law as of yet.32
By contrast, the CCCS judge retains jurisdiction over
coordinated cases from pretrial through resolution. This consistency
fosters efficiency for several reasons. First, since the judge oversees
the litigation from the beginning, she will have the opportunity to
become well-versed in the key issues in the case. This enables the
CCCS judges to more easily structure their case management
decisions with an eye toward faster resolution.323 Second, retaining
the same judge eliminates uncertainty surrounding the binding nature
of pretrial decisions. Since the CCCS judge is the only supervisory
authority on the case, her rulings are binding on the parties through
trial. In the federal MDL courts where split authority is the rule,
however, the extent to which a judge to whom a case has been
remanded should be able to revisit or overturn rulings by the prior
MDL transferee judge is an unsettled question.324 Confusion can
arise because of separate rulings in the pretrial and trial jurisdictions.
Although the trial court is the ultimate arbiter of the proceedings
before it, deference is normally accorded to the decisions of the
MDL transferee court in practice.2  A longtime MDL Panel
member, Judge Stanley Weigel, lends further support for such
deference by stating that allowing transferor courts to overturn
transferee courts would "undermin[e] the purpose and usefulness of.
. . Section 1407" by undercutting finality at the trial level.326 In
contrast, CCCS judges are free to initiate more creative case
management actions without concern for impeding the authority of
the ultimate trial judge.
322. See Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005);
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004);
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong. § 2
(2001).
323. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106. For an example, see the discussion of
"trial in a box" in supra Part V.A.2.
324. See HERRMANN ETAL., supra note 9, at 14.
325. Interview with R. Gary Klausner, supra note 75.
326. See Weigel, supra note 314, at 577 (emphasizing the importance of finality to the
convenience of witnesses and litigants and to efficient conduct of cases).
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If our hypothetical case3 27 were filed in the CCCS, the judge
could order counsel for Joe Writer and BYDA to propose jury
instructions on an element of the cause of action two weeks into
proceedings. 28 The parties would then submit motions, and the
judge would rule on them. This ruling would then guide discovery.
By using preliminary jury instructions to shape discovery, the CCCS
helps define the key issues at an early stage, eliminating uncertainty
and improving efficiency.
3 29
2. A Second Advantage of the CCCS
The second advantage of the CCCS can be described by the old
sports adage: practice makes perfect. CCCS judges specialize in
handling complex cases. Complex cases comprise a CCCS judge's
entire docket, and as a result, the case management techniques
employed in the CCCS are refined daily.33° Such continuous contact
with difficult legal issues and causes of action breeds a degree of
expertise in case management that makes the CCCS judges very
efficient. The exclusive focus on complex cases allows CCCS
judges to hone their case management skills by developing tools
through regular, rigorous trial and error.33' This continuous, active
judicial management also lends a consistency to the proceedings that
makes it easy for counsel to know what to expect from the judge.332
Since CCCS judges often see the same plaintiff and defense counsel
in successive litigation, establishing good communication and a
commitment to moving the case toward resolution is an organic part
of the proceedings.333 Familiarity with these innovative procedures
allows the judge and counsel to focus on substantive issues, as
opposed to rules of procedure.334 Moreover, CCCS judges do not
327. See supra Part 1.
328. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106 (describing a common tool that she
employs in complex case management).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Interview with Victoria Chaney, supra note 196 (describing the importance of learning
from mistakes to a judge's development as a case manager). For specific examples of CCCS case
management techniques in action, see supra Parts V.A. 1-5.
332. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
333. Id. (describing the attitude in CCCS litigation that trial is a fallback, i.e., a last chance
means to dispense with the case, and supporting the notion that communicative counsel is the best
way to avoid, when possible, the cost and strain of trial).
334. Id.
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have to keep reinventing the complex case management wheel after
they work out the initial procedural kinks associated with new
procedures. For example, the issue management techniques
incorporated by Judge West in the AOL Time Warner Litigation,335
will enable him to focus on more substantive issues from the outset
in subsequent shareholder derivative actions.
Certainly, federal judges have developed similar case
management expertise in the MDL arena. Because of the diversity of
federal dockets (including both civil and criminal actions), however,
the opportunity to focus specifically on complex civil case
management is not present to the same degree as in the CCCS. In a
recent study of all prescription drug cases transferred by the MDL
panel since the early 1970s, the most frequently cited factor
supporting MDL transfer was the capacity of the transferee court to
handle multi-district litigation.336 Court "capacity" refers to caseload
considerations and availability of court resources-including
electronic means-to handle the litigation.337  Although past
experience with the MDL process or experience in the litigation
subject area is important,338 it is only one factor that goes into
deciding which judge gets an MDL case. The MDL panel considers
other factors, such as location of the transferee court, travel for
potential witnesses, judge neutrality, and pendency of any related
state claims.339 Ultimately, both the federal MDL process and the
CCCS strive for the same goal: "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every case."34 However, the specialized nature of
the CCCS permits a more targeted approach to the unique demands
of complex litigation.
B. The Empire Strikes Back: Advantages of the MDL
Despite the advantages of the CCCS, the federal MDL process
promotes good case management practices more successfully in two
335. See supra Part V.A.I.
336. James M. Wood, Monique Hunt McWilliams & Delaney M. Anderson, The Selection of
a Transferee Court for MDL, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2007, at 13.
337. Id. at 19.
338. Id. at 20-21 (citing experience of the transferee judge as operative in approximately one
quarter of cases).
339. See generally id. (describing the various factors that influence MDL Panel decisions
regarding transferee courts).
340. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, see also, DESKBOOK, supra note 35, § 1.01.
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ways: the structure and functioning of summary judgment
mechanisms and the ability of the MDL courts to block late
appearing parties from filing motions to change judges.
1. Summary Judgment
One major difference between the CCCS and the federal MDL
courts is the wording of the summary judgment statutes and the use
of summary judgment as a case management tool. Ultimately, the
flexibility of federal summary judgment procedures, which allow
judges to dispense with individual issues in a cause of action, better
serves the principles of effective case management than CCCS
summary judgment procedures, which only permit summary
judgment on entire causes of action.341
In federal court, the procedural rule governing summary
judgment states that if no triable issue of material fact exists in all or
a portion of a party's claim, the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on all or part of the claim.342 The upshot for
complex cases is that the transferee court can resolve individual
issues within a cause of action that have been coordinated under the
MDL statute by granting an appropriate summary judgment
motion.343 For example, In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan, on
October 31, 2000,,'4 was an MDL proceeding arising out of
numerous individual claims resulting from an airplane crash in
Taiwan.345 The Warsaw Convention346 applied in most of the cases
brought against Singapore Airlines.347 The district court held that
under the Warsaw Convention all punitive damages claims against
341. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
342. See FED R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(d).
343. See Interview with Gary A. Feess, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., in
L.A., Cal. (February 7, 2008).
344. C. D. Cal. No. MDL 1394 (2002).
345. Order Granting Singapore Airline's Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication of
Punitive Damages Issue app. A, In re Air Crash, MDL 1394 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Recent Opinions" hyperlink; then follow "All Opinions
and Orders" hyperlink; then follow "2002" hyperlink; then follow "MDL 1394 GAF (RCx)"
hyperlink).
346. The Warsaw Convention limits liability of an air carrier in international air
transportation. See 8A AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 82 (2007).
347. Order Granting Singapore Airline's Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication of
Punitive Damages Issue, supra note 345, at 2.
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Singapore Airlines could not stand.34 8 By eliminating this facet of
the claim, the federal court effectively whittled down the complex
action piece by piece into a more manageable form.
On the other hand, California's current summary judgment rule
states that a judge can only dispose of an entire cause of action,
affirmative defense, issue of duty, or category of damages.349
Interestingly, the language in the CCP mirrored the federal summary
judgment statute closely until 1990. At that time, the California
legislature expressly amended section 437(f) of the CCP to eliminate
the ability to move for summary adjudication on some, but not all, of
the issues in a claim.35" This wording reflects the legislature's intent
to adopt an "all or nothing" mindset regarding summary judgment
motions. 351' This procedural change came on the heels of significant
efforts to make summary judgment easier to invoke on the federal
level.352 While these federal cases succeeded in making it easier on
the moving party in summary judgment proceedings at the federal
level,353 the backlash in California had a chilling effect on the ability
of CCCS judges to use an important early disposition tool. CCCS
judges are, in effect, attempting to whittle down large cases with a
very dull knife.
To illustrate the effect of the federal summary judgment
standard in the CCCS, examine again the introductory hypothetical.
Imagine that BYDA in its dealings with the subcontractors
implemented a series of change orders354 pertaining to the work on
Joe Writer's house. For example, BYDA instructs the plumbing
company to use PVC piping instead of copper to save money and
instructs the tile company to use slate instead of marble for the same
reason. Now imagine that Joe Writer's fraud claim against BYDA is
348. Id. at 6.
349. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (West 2004).
350. See id. § 437c(f) historical and statutory notes at 280-81.
351. See id. § 437c historical and statutory notes at 281 ("It is also the intent of this legislation
to stop the practice of adjudication of facts or adjudication of issues that do not completely
dispose of a cause of action or a defense.").
352. See the trilogy of cases: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
353. See Thomas R. Freeman, Put Up or Shut Up, L.A. LAW., Nov. 1999
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfin?pageid= 1336.
354. A change order is an order to deviate from a prior construction method.
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based on thirty of these change orders. Under the current rule
governing the CCCS, the court could not streamline the proceedings
by dispensing with any meritless contentions regarding change
orders made for valid reasons. If only one of these change orders
turns out to be indisputably legitimate, then the court will be unable
to excise that meritless contention from Joe's claim. In California,
the summary adjudication of individual factual issues that dispose of
only part of a cause of action is improper.355 Conversely, under the
federal standard for partial summary judgment, the court could
eliminate the baseless assertions regarding the change order from
Joe's fraud claim.356 By streamlining causes of action in this manner,
the federal statute is a more effective means of managing complex
cases than current procedures in the CCCS.
2. Late Appearing Parties
The federal MDL process uses a more straightforward and
sensible method than the CCCS when dealing with a late appearing
party357 who objects to the MDL Panel's choice of a transferee court.
If a party objects to the judge presiding over the transferee court in
federal court, the party can make a challenge by filing an
extraordinary writ motion to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the transferee court.35t  Such writs are rarely granted.359
Conversely, a wrinkle in the CCCS procedures allows a party to file
an affidavit to change judges in a complex case at any time before
trial.36° Specifically, CCP section 170.6 states that a late appearing
party can make a motion to disqualify the judge even if the judge has
355. See Tutor-Saliba-Perini v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., No. B143430, 2005
WL240685, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2005).
356. CCCS judges have instituted some practical workarounds to mitigate summary judgment
concerns. The parties can stipulate to eliminate certain aspects of the action (e.g., a plaintiff
could agree to drop a baseless claim from the litigation if it is an obstacle to settlement).
Additionally, judges can seek to isolate key issues through motions in limine to cull troublesome
matters from consideration or early drafting of jury instructions to focus discovery from the outset
of litigation. Interview with Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106.
357. A late appearing party can enter the proceedings via a "tag along action." R.P.J.P.M.L.
1.1 defines a "tag along action" as a civil action "involving common questions of fact with
actions previously transferred under Section 1407." For a further discussion of issues
surrounding tag along actions, see Randall A. Spencer, Multidistrict Litigation: Part II, ASS'N
Bus. TRIAL LAW. REP., Spring 2007, at 1.
358. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2000).
359. For a discussion of the appellate procedures in the MDL process, see supra Part IV.B.
360. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6(a) (West 2004).
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presided over pre-trial aspects of the case.36' Oddly, parties that are
added later to formally coordinated complex cases do not have the
same option to challenge the appointment of the trial judge.3 62 For
example, the court in Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court of
Santa Clara County 63 held that the CRC do not allow a late
appearing party to peremptorily challenge the trial judge in a
coordinated proceeding.3" As such, procedural inconsistencies in the
CCCS make it easier to change judges when the actions have been
designated complex but have not gone through the coordination
procedures of CCP section 404. The practical application of this
difference between the CCCS procedures for coordinated cases and
complex cases is that a late-appearing party can throw an entire
proceeding back to square one.
Again, the introductory hypothetical is instructive. Suppose that
discovery reveals to BYDA that a lumber company sold substandard
materials to the roofer that resulted in leaks. BYDA then adds the
lumber company to the action. As it turns out, the roofer had been
previously involved in a contentious prior litigation before the
coordination trial judge and feels the trial judge would be prejudiced.
The roofer can file a challenge under section 170.6 of the CCP and
seek to have the judge removed, even if all the other parties agreed to
the judge and participated in numerous pretrial case management
conferences and hearings. It is no wonder that CCCS judges lament
this potential for delay as a procedural shortcoming of the CCCS.365
In contrast, MDL proceedings do not invite this type of "judge
shopping." For example, in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Products Liability Litigation,366 the MDL Panel expressly stated its
predisposition against allowing peremptory challenges: "[W]e have
determined to look beyond the preferences of the parties in our
search for a transferee judge with the ability and temperament to
361. Id. § 170.6(a)(2).
362. See Sch. Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 618 (Ct. App.
1997) (stating that judicial disqualification procedures in complex cases are not the same as in
coordinated cases).
363. 262 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1989).
364. Id. at 546.
365. Interview with Judge Carolyn B. Kuhl, supra note 106 (maintaining that protection
against such late arriving challenges should extend to non coordinated complex cases in the
CCCs).
366. 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
CLASSLESS NOT CLUELESS
steer this complex litigation on a steady course that will be sensitive
to the concerns of all parties." '367 Moreover, Judge Stanley Weigel, a
longtime member of the MDL Panel, states that the panel does not
consider litigant preference in determining the transferee court, nor
does the MDL Panel have the power to influence any decisions that
the transferee judge makes.368
The California Courts of Appeal placed the ultimate
responsibility for addressing this issue with the legislature.369 The
court questioned the logic of the California legislature's failure to
amend disqualification rules in light of the immense effort and
resources expended in creating trial delay reduction programs like
the CCCS.37 ° Perhaps it is time for the legislature to take up the
challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the CCCS provides a solid model for future
innovative techniques in managing complex litigation. By
structuring a court system that is accessible to any litigant whose
case meets the complex criteria, the CCCS stands as an important
adaptation of judicial resources to better meet the needs of modern
litigants. By expressly calling for early and active judicial
involvement and creating practical mechanisms for case aggregation
and management, the CCCS provides guidelines for moving complex
cases along while maintaining enough flexibility to allow
practitioners and judges room to maneuver in seeking to facilitate
ever more efficient means of case resolution. Ultimately, the clarity
of mission, precision of statutes, and creative management
techniques that characterize California's approach may prove to be
the most workable template for similar specialized courts around the
country.
367. Id. (emphasis added).
368. Weigel, supra note 314, at 578 (referencing In re Holiday Magic Securities Litigation,
433 F.Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977), In re Molinaro/Catanzaro Patent Litigation, 402
F.Supp. 1404, 1406 (J.P.M.L. 1975), and In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, 368
F.Supp. 805, 806 (J.P.M.L. 1973), as further support of the notion that MDL transfer does not
consider the litigants' concerns about past or future rulings of the transferee judge).
369. Sch. Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 618 n.6. (Ct.
App. 1997).
370. Id.
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